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This paper attempts to indicate the direction which
Philippine policy should take in relation to housing the country's
urban poor. More specifically, it discusses three corollary pro-
positions: -- that the Philippines urban housing situation
is embedded in the fundamental economic and socio-
political context of the nation's development
-- that the Philippines housing policy is lacking in
effective and equitable provision of housing servi-
ces for the urban poor, and serves to maintain the
general picture of poverty and income inequality
-- that an alternative approach to housing the urban
poor must be based on a redirection of national deve-
lopment goals toward a more equitable distribution
of the benefits accruing to national development.
Chapter One defines the purpose and method, and the relevance of
the study. Chapter Two outlines the Philippine urban housing situ-
ation as government planners and housing officials, view it, citing
rapid population growth, low incomes, low investments in housing,
urban land shortage, and lack of government concern.
Chapter Three discusses the economic and sociopolitical conditions
in the Philippines which underlie the formation and maintenance
of low-income densely-populated settlements. Such aspects as the
dependent state of the economy, retarded agricultural and indus-
trial growth, disparities in wealth and power are shown to impose
institutional constraints on choices made by low-income families.
The formation of slum and squatter settlements is held to be a ra
tional response of urban poor families to the economic and social
conditions which they encounter in city life.
Chapter Four analyzes past government housing action, stressing
the maintenance of disparities in economic wealth and social power.
What has been termed public policy in housing has in fact been a
strategy to provide luxurious housing for those already well-housed.
Chapter Five discusses an outline of an alternative housing stra-
tegy essentially concerned with redistributional effects. Sites-
and-services development and aided self-help housing, as well as
controls on rental housing are presented. Housing finance and the
relevant economic and political issues re-directed toward equity
considerations as well as efficiency factors conclude the paper.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUQTION
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
It is my purpose in this paper to indicate the direction
which Philippine public policy should take in relation to housing
the country's urban poor. This I shall attempt to do by dealing
with three corollary propositions:
1. That the Philippines' urban housing situation -- particu-
larly the housing situation of poor urban families -- is
embedded in the fundamental economic and sociopolitical
context of the nation.
2. That the Philippines' housing policy is lacking in effec-
tive and equitable provision of housing services for the
urban poor and thus serves to maintain the general picture
of poverty, unemployment/underemployment, and income ine-
quality.
3. That an alternative approach to housing urban poor fami-
lies must be based on a redirection of national develop-
ment goals toward a more equitable sharing of the benefits
accruing from development.
To develop these propositions, the paper is organized into
five chapters.
Chapter One defines the purpose and method of the study and
discusses the relevance of an analysis of this nature vis-a-vis
current thinking and writing on the subject of housing policy in
developing countries.
Chapter Two outlines the Philippine urban housing situation
from the viewpoint of government planners and housing officials.
The specific aspects of the "housing problem" as they see it are
discussed, together with a number of economic and political factors
which they recognize as impinging on the urban housing situation.
The government perspective is evaluated as too sectoral, effecting
no comprehensive, realistic appraisal of the urban housing problem.
Chapter Three on the other hand discusses the economic and
sociopolitical conditions in the Philippines which underlie the
formation and maintenance of low-income urban settlements. Such
aspects as the dependent nature of the Philippine economy, the
retarded growth of agricultural and industrial production, a dual
labor market, and disparities in wealth and power among the Fili-
pino population are identified as institutional constraints imposed
on low-income urban families. The proliferation of slum and squat-
ter communities is shown to be a rational response of urban poor
households to the economic and sociopolitical conditions which they
encounter.
Chapter Four analyzes past government housing action, stres-
sing the maintenance of disparities in economic wealth and socio-
political power reflected in disparities in levels of housing ser-
vices enjoyed by different income groups. What has been termed
public policy in housing has in fact been a strategy to provide
more luxurious housing for the well-off who are already well-housed,
at the expense of the lower-income households who are in direst
need of even the minimum of housing services.
Chapter Five enunciates an alternative housing approach
essentially concerned with the redistributional effects of housing
action. It emphasizes direct assistance to poor urban families in-
stead of the filtering strategy espoused by past housing policy.
Specific housing action such as sites-and-services development
and aided self-help housing are suggested for their redistributional
potential, and related to the broader issues of housing finance
and urban land policy. Finally, the re-direction of national deve-
lopment goals as these affect migration patterns and the differ-
ential development of urban and rural sectors, between agricultu-
ral and industrial sectors, are discussed in light of their impli-
cations for the formulation of a strategy to house the urban poor.
B. SURVEY OF LITERATURE
This paper essentially draws from current writing on the
subject of housing the urban poor in developing countries. Of the
relevant literature, those which have been most useful are the
following:
a. Literature indicating the historical patterns and direc-
tion of the Philippine economy and sociopolitical structure.
Under this category are reports by government economists
and planners, technical reports by local and international
development agencies, historical accounts by Filipino and
foreign historians and political analysts.
b. Literature explicating the housing policies and programs
espoused by the Philippine government. These include national
four-year plans, reports from housing agencies, proceedings
of a national conference on housing, and reports by private
developers associated with government housing activities.
o* Literature relating to radical analyses of underdevelopment
in general, and urban problems in particular, in Third World
countries.
d. Literature on housing programs proposed or implemented in
other developing countries, with program goals related to
broader economic and sociopolitical development goals, as
in recent Chile and Tanzania.
C. RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY
The relevance of this paper lies in its attempt to examine
the various dimensions of the Philippine urban housing situation,
and then to synthesize the same dimensions in the formulation of
public housing policy. The aim is to develop guidelines for a stra-
tegy to house poor Filipino families in urban areas, based on the
perspective that the housing situation is part of the country's
development processes. The socioeconomic context of the Philippines
is seen to be one which maintains high rates of unemployment or
underemployment and low levels of income among a large sector of
the population. The paper thus identifies the institutional con-
straints on choices made by low-income families and recognizes
the limitations of traditional approaches which rely on conventional
construction processes to satisfy the growing needs of these fami-
lies.
The paper departs from the traditional sectoral view of
housing by contending that since each family pursues its own
"housing solution" according to its advance in the socio-economic
integration process, a realistic housing strategy must first seek
to accelerate low-income families' advance in the socio-economic
integration process, even as it aims to harness the resources of
low-income families to accelerate their spontaneous housing acti-
vity.
D. METHOD AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This paper is the product of library research and field
observation. The direct experience culled from two years' work
on a feasibility study of a low-cost workers' housing project in
the Manila metropolitan area and of a community development pro-
ject in a squatter resettlement site outside Manila, provided me
with insights into the nature and dynamics of the housing situa-
tion of lower-income urban families. Analyses of Philippine govern-
ment housing reports, economic planning reports and housing indus-
try reports were substantiated by brief visits to slum clearance
sites and resettlement sites as well as by interviews with hous-
ing officials during a summer visit to the Philippines. My intro-
duction to different perspectives or the development process in
developing countries during my course of study at MIT also provi-
ded the basis for much of this paper's critical anlysis of the
Philippines' problems of poverty and unemployment -- important
dimensions of the urban housing situation.
Analysing the Philippine urban housing problem from a
broad perspective carries with it certain limitations. The discus-
sion is necessarily restricted to historical trends in agricultu-
ral and industrial growth, to patterns of wealth and power distri-
bution, to characteristics of urban slum and squatter settlements,
to over-all results of government housing action and to an outline
of an alternative housing strategy. It does not attempt detailed
treatment of these issues, nor does it allow for modifications of
generalized issues under discussion. However, this kind of macro-
level analysis fills the gap between already exisin tpieces of
sectoral studies and injects into these a more coherent thread of
analysis.
Another limitation is the reliance on secondary information,
6the validity of which cannot be precisely ascertained. The paper
recognises the possible discrepancies between policies and pro-
jects as these are "announced" or written about in reports, and
as these are actually carried out. Yet again, the significance
of deficiencies in reporting are not too substantial in light of
the paper's purpose to address itself to the broad implications
of housing policy.
CHAPTER TWO
ASPECTS OF THE PHILIPPINE HOUSING PROBLEM
Philippine government housing reports on the whole use as
a starting point in any discussion of the Philippine housing situ-
ation the magnitude of the nation's housing need. As explained in
these reports, housing need is a compound of the following ele-
ments: housing needed to make up for the existing shortage of
dwelling units, to replace the large quantity of substandard
housing now occupied, to replace those lost through natural dete-
rioration and calamities, and housing needed because of the addi-
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tional population due to natural increase and to migration.
A. SHORTAGE OF HOUSING STOCK
It is interesting to note that housing need is perceived by
Philippine housing officials in terms of housing stock, in numbers
of physical dwelling structures rated according to an unspecified
scale of standards defining a "decent" house. Using this ambi-
guous definition, government reports invariably come up with dif-
fering estimates of the nationwide housing need, with figures
ranging from 100,000 units a year to 400,oo units a year. The
most recent estimates by the NEDA (National Economic Development
Authority) for the period 1960-1980 place the need for dwelling
units at 470,000 per year -- 100,000 per year in urban areas and
370,000 in rural areas.
Figures for 1970 indicate a housing stock of 5,186,873
dwelling units for the nation as a whole -- 1,089,328 in urban
areas and 4,097,545 in rural areas. Population for 1970 was
estimated at a little less than 37 million -- over 11* million
urban and 25 million rural, with households numbering 2 million
urban and 4.3 million rural. Based on the difference between the
obtained number of households and the obtained number of existing
dwelling units, the shortage of dwelling units was placed at
1,121,759 -- 918,510 urban and 203.349 rural. Two-thirds of the
declared national urban dwelling-unit shortage was said to be con-
centrated in the metropolitan Manila area.
B. DEFICIENCIES IN THE BUNDLE OF HOUSING SERVICES
The Philippine urban housing situation can also be viewed
as marked by serious deficiencies in the bundle of urban housing
services available to the population. Of the existing physical
structures themselves, the Journal of Philippine Statistics (July-
Sept. 1968) reported that in 1967, of a total of 1,515,000 urban
households, only 24.6% lived in houses or buildings either newly
built or in good condition. Less than half (54.9%) lived in
structures in fair conditions or needing only minor repairs and
the remaining 18.8% in poor-condition houses or buildings which
were structurally weak or needed general repair. This count exclu-
ded households living in even worse-off housing as far as govern-
ment standards were concerned, such as barong-barongs (makeshift,
patchwork dwellings), barges, boats, ruins and the like.
In terms of lighting, water, and sanitary facilities, in
1967 the Journal of Philippine Statistics reports that only 62.8%
of urban households enjoyed electric services; 56.2% of households
were supplied water through a waterworks system; toilet facilities
of any kind were not found among 16% of urban households, and
among those who had some form of toilet system, only 34% had
water-sealed toilets.
C. SLUM AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENT FORMATION
The rapid growth and proliferation of slum and squatter
settlements in urban areas are seen by government planners as
blatant indicators that a housing problem exists. They cite the
results of a survey of major urban centers by the United Nations
and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation team in 1963-64
which show the ratio of slum and squatter families to the total
population of each city.
City Percent Slum or Squatter
Metropolitan Manila 10.0%
Baguio City 27.0
Iligan City 7.5
Davao City 8.5
Cagayan de Oro 11.0
Ozamis City 25.0
Cotabato City 0.0
Butuan City 43.5
Marawi City 44.5
At the growth rate of squatter areas of 12 percent per year,
substantially larger proportions of the urban centers are now
settled by squatters, reaching a third of the urban population
in metropolitan Manila today, for instance. To this day, no
adequate definition of who are squatters or slumdwellers, and who
are not, are proferred by housing officials. But they are certainly
alarmed about low-income settlements which they identify with
criminality, public health hazards, and threats to political stability.
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D. FACTORS RELATED TO URBAN HOUSING PROBLEMS
Government housing officials are quick to point out that
the shortage of dwelling units is aggravated by a number of demo-
graphic, economic, and political factors which are interrelated.
Among the factors they cite most frequently are the following:
the rapid growth in population, particularly in urban centers; the
low levels of income among the majority of Filipino families; the
relatively small investment in the housing sector; the shortage
and high cost of urban land and land development? the lack of
serious government concern in housing.
1. Rapid population growth -
The population of the Philippines, 40 million at latest
count, has been growing at a rate of over 3 per cent per annum
since the early half of the century. The population growth rate
in urban areas is even higher -- over 4 per cent per annum --
largely due to the heavy influx of rural migrants. Migration into
the cities remains unchecked and continues to increase at a rate
of 12 per cent per annum. The pressure of sheer numbers on the
cities* housing and urban services have been used by some govern-
ment officials as justification for a policy of what they call
"benign neglect" toward a situation they believe they are unable
to cope with. To many officials, the demands placed on the cities
by their oversized populations are too much for the cities' re-
sources.
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2. Low levels of income -
Government planners recognize that the very low levels of
income among the majority of Filipino households have generally
incapacitated these families from acquiring the housing services
they need. The PHHC (People's Hemesite and Housing Corporation )
has estimated incomes of urban households in order to approximate
2
the housing costs which these families can afford.
Table 1. Af
Annual
Family Income
Over P10,000,
10,000
8,000
6,000
,000
2,000
1,500
1,000
Below 1,000
rordable Housing Costs, by Fam
at Current Terms (1971)
Family Distribution %
M. Manila Other urban
14.3
6.3
7.7
7.3
10.3
14.8
9.9
9.0
5.8
2.
o.8
5.1
34
.3
4.8
5.6
12.2
9.2
12.4
14.4
10.0
6.5
nily Incomes
Monthly Income
Allocable to Hag.
(25%) P208.33
(25%) 166.66
(20%) 100.00
(20%) 83.30
(20%) 66.66
(20%) 50.00
(20%) 33.00
(15%) 18.75
(10%) 8.33
-- o
Affordable
10 yrs./
12% p.a.
P18,150
14,520
8,710
7,260
5,800
4,365
2,875
1,625
725
(Current exchange rates place the US dollar
more than 6.5 Philippine pesos.)
equivalent to a little
Because of their low incomes, what most households can afford
to pay for housing services is way below the cost for which housing
services are presently made available. The competitive forces in
the open housing market tend to equate the quantity of housing
services supplied with the actual quantity that families can afford
to pay for. Since substantially more families need housing than can
12
afford them, a shortage of housing services occurs in this sense.
Considering that the lowest-priced house in the urban
market (standard dwelling unit of 60 sq.m., single-detached, on a
200-sq.m. lot) is averaged at P17,500 (1971 estimate), it can be
deduced that only families earning above 10,000 pesos then per
annum could afford standard housing at prevailing terms of 10
years repayment period at 12% interest rate per annu. But less than
ton per cent of Filipino urban households earn more than P10,000
yearly and can thus be said to have the buying power for standard
housing services. The remaining ninety per cent or more of urban
families who have lower incomes either have to allocate a much
greater portion of their incomes to housing or to resort to below-
standard housing.
By NEDA' s definition of housing demand -- defined as the
market demand for standard dwelling units based on people's will-
ingness and capacity to pay for standard housing -- 3
- Twelve per cent (12%) can afford housing available at open
market terms (those earning P10,000 or more yearly)
- Twenty-three percent (23%) can afford homeownership pro-
vided they are extended long-term financing at reasonable
interest rates (6-7% interest p.a., 25-30 years to pay) at
minimum land, development, and construction costs (annual
incomes of P4,000 to P9,999)
- Sixty-five per cent (65%) cannot afford adequate shelter
even at reduced costs (those earning incomes of less than
M4,000 yearly) and therefore need government-subsidized
housing.
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3. Low levels of investment in the housing sector -
Housing investment on the part of both government and
private sectors have been relatively small, and the little that
has been invested have been skewed toward higher-cost upper-
income housing.
The NEDA reports that only 2.6% of the country's GNP is
invested in housing construction, as against 4-6% in the United
States and Europe. Of course the investment considered by reports
like the NEDA's refers only to new construction of standard hous-
ing and excludes the inputs made by lower-income families in non-
conventional homebuilding. According to the NEDA, only two dwel-
ling units as against the need for twelve per thousand popula-
tion are built yearly in the whole country.
For the period 1948-1972 the government has built only
13,500 units, about 80% of which are standard housing built for
those who could pay for these homes (economic housing). The re-
maining 20% have been directed to social housing -- a program
which has to date affected only 3,000 families, 2,200 in public
tenements and 730 in resettlement projects.
Private housing construction accounts for 80 to 90 per
cent of housing activity in the country. It must be pointed out,
however, that of the privately-built housing, as much as 60% of
actual financing is supplied by government loans, and only 40%
by private capital. Due to the high costs of urban land and con-
struction, as well as the high costs of financing, privately-
built housing has been geared to upper-middle and upper-income
housing. Private commercial banks, insurance companies, and other
financial institutions prefer not to risk long-term low-interest
investments necessary for low-cost housing, but rather prefer to
invest in commercial and industrial loans where repayment periods
are shorter and rates of interest higher. Savings banks and savings
and loan associations are too few in number and again have resor-
ted to utilizing their funds for short-term loans and investments
for which a ready market exists.
4. Urban Land Problem -
Government planners cite three elements of the urban land
problem, namely (1) shortage of urban land, (2) high costs of
raw land, (3) high costs of land development. Among the assertions
of "Land shortage is not due to land hunger but due to speculation"
are mentioned the following circumstances.
(1) There is no law limiting extent of ownership of urban
lands.
(2) There is no law to compel development of idle lands and
to prevent speculation.
(3) The Constitution does not allow expropriation of pri-
vate property for government housing projects, nor
grant preemptive rights to government.
(4) There is no law allowing the system of 99-year lease,
which can prevent or diminish the recurring cycle of
land need.
(5) The stability of the torrens title is being undermined
by flaws in land registration procedures.
5. Lack of serious government concern -
The absence of a well-defined housing policy is generally
cited by government housing officials as one of the factors aggra-
vating the housing picture. Esteban Bernido, Presidential Assis-
tant on Housing and Resettlement states the view that housing has
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not received serious attention from public policymakers:
...If there had been any housing policies enumerated by
Congress they were but sporadic and/or isolated programs
designed to meet peculiar problems...
Ours is about the only country without an annual bud-
getary appropriation for housing purposes. We do not have,
strictly speaking, a centralized administrative body of
a cabinet or department level to look after this all-impor-
tant and vital aspect of national growth...
As a result, the government has not set forth policies
that are indispensable in creating a favorable atmosphere
and generating incentives for low-cost housing, such as
financing and the acquisition of urban lands. If any such
policies exist, they are either misdirected or confused
because of the proliferation of many offices and agencies
involved in housing, each inadequately organized and funded
under individual corporate policies, resulting thus in
the overlapping and duplication of functions.
Summary-
At first glance, it would seem that the factors cited by
government planners and housing officials as underlying the Philip-
pines' housing problem constitute an adequate list of the variables
impinging on the situation. Correspondingly, one would readily con-
clude that by coming up with specific responses to the five problem
areas cited, the Philippine housing situation could be placed well
under control. So long as population growth was checked, levels
of income raised, housing investment increased, urban land made
available, and government mobilized, it would seem that the problem
would be solved.
The question arises, however, as to what steps toward these
directions government planners and housing officials are able to
conceive, are willing to adopt, and which of these they are likely
to effectively implement. If government planners today are saying
much the same things that they or past planners have said about
16
solving the urban housing problem, what is the likelihood that
planners today will do what they contend should be done more effec-
tively than in the past?
The following chapter will suggest that the housing pro-
blem as defined by government planners today is no more likely to
be alleviated in the foreseeable future than it was in the past,
given that the social, economic, and political contexts of the
urban housing situation then and now remain relatively unchanged.
NOTES Chapter Two
1. Josefina Ramos, "A Brief on Housing in the Philippines",
Article A, p.1, HOUSING IN THE PHILIPPINES; Prepara-
tory Materials for the Conference on Housing, NEDA 1973.
2. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation report, 1971.
3. Ramos, OP. cit., p.3.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT
OF THE URBAN HOUSING PROBLEM
While the preceding section enumerated the factors cited
by government as underlying the housing problem, this chapter
seeks to trace the issues to the more fundamental variables. The
aim is hopefully to better understand why it is that the Philip-
pine urban population grows at an alarming rate, why levels of
income remain low, why financing for housing is scarce, why urban
land is in short supply and costly, why government seemingly can-
not cope with the urban housing situation -- and in sum, why
the housing problem (defined narrowly as the growth of slum and
squatter settlements) remains and continues.
Anthony Leeds has developed an interpretative scheme which
specifies a number of significant variables affecting the form,
1
characteristics, and state of development of squatter settlements.
What will be attempted in this chapter is a discussion patterned
after Leeds' model of the set of basic economic and sociopolitical
variables which generate the formation of slum and squatter set-
tlements in Philippine urban centers.
A. FORM OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Among the variables determining the character of squatter
settlements, Leeds considers as most fundamental the form of the
national economy; the fact that true squatter settlements appear
only in capitalist societies, although not with equal frequency
18
and intensity. He notes that squatter-settlement formation is
reduced or virtually absent in advanced capitalist societies,
as well as in capitalist societies which are only starting to in-
dustrialize or to develop urban service sectors. He concludes that
squatter formation is a product of the transformation process of
urban systems from mercantile to widespread industrial economies.
One central aspect of capitalist organization which gives
the broadest explanatory power is the institution of private,
alienable property, as explained by Leeds thus:
Private property, on one hand, excludes and denies claims of
all except the owner of a piece of property, necessarily
eliminating or sharply restricting communal interests, uses,
or claims, and on the other, gives the owner a negotiable
value to be used in his private or personal interest... In
capitalist societies, therefore, there is a constant conflict
between the public and the private interests with a tendency
for the latter to predominate unless a specific interest as
interfering overly with the private interests of others. It
is interesting to note that solutions to housing problems in
capitalist societies by private interest and public authori-
ties are uniformly in terms of the private ownership of
habitationalunits, never in terms of communal ownership. Even
condominia refer only to pieces of property held in common
by an aggregate of private owners. 2
Since private property is inextricably linked to a system
of profits for private persons, exclusive private ownership is
important for using immovable property to make profits. Intense
competition for immovable property arises, not necessarily for
profit ends, but also for other purposes that immovable property,
such as land, serve -- for example, housing and productive uses
like agriculture -- but which may also subserve profit ends.
With prices rising with scarcity, what usually happens is
that the price-scarcity relation becomes increasingly subject to
19
manipulation and speculation. In the dense inner cities, for
example, new needs for urban land are generated even as the amount
of available land remains unchanged. Prices therefore soar and
profit and speculation increase. Urban land and housing can thus
be considered important sectors of the profit system, objects of
extreme value and competition in the flow of capital, the economy
of civil construction, in private and public financing systems,
in the structure of private incomes.
Leeds cites another level of competition arising from the
fact that land and housing are also basic necessities for living
for all people, i.e., the competition between occupancy for reasons
of need versus occupancy for profit ends. As urbanization increases,
the competition increases, too. More intensive use of land occurs
alongside the expansion of the labor market in the very areas
where land values rise most rapidly and speculation grows most in-
tense.
The increasing values also generate the dual labor market
constituted by the "employed" and the "underemployed" -- which
characterize countries which are experiencing a rapid transition
from labor-intensive to capital-intensive technologies. The expan-
sion of the labor market, in turn, generates migratory streams
heading toward the cities -- increasingly so as earlier arrivals
establish more communications to their places of origin.
Some aspects of the model presented by Leeds are edkoed by
a few Philippine planners and economic analysts, even though they
do not directly attribute these phenomena to capitalist organi-
zation.
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If one were to rank individual causes of the (housing)
shortage in a hierarchy, the helm post will almost certainly
go to economic policies that induced massive urban migration
and those that unintentionally discourage productivity...
Unsuspecting economic policies, therefore, that concentra-
ted income opportunities to port areas like Manila stands
out as a major factor to the housing dilemma. Labor mobility,
which precipitated the scramble for space between industry and
dwellers gave rise to high land prices... As the call of
urban "opportunity" continued to spread, migrants responded
to the point of accepting uneconomical marginal jobs to start
with. People so employed gave gradual impetus to the emergence
of cheap low-cost slums. 3
What perhaps can be called into question is the above
contention that the economic policies which generated the housing
"dilemma" did not deliberately discourage productivity, and that
these policies were "unsuspecting." Later in this chapter, it
will be pointed out that the policies were meant to serve conscious
interests of a powerful elite, and that these cannot be labelled
as too innocent of maintaining the unproductive economic situa-
tions in Philippine urban centers.
B. STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Capitalism is a succession of forms (mercantilist, indus-
trial, finance capitalism, etc.), each displaying developmental
phases. Leeds distinguishes among forms and phases primarily by
means of the different origins of capitalist forms in specific
countries. He distinguishes between "primary" and "secondary"
evolutionary sequences of capitalist development -- the former
exemplified by societies like Spain, France, Holland, England,
and later Germany and the United States, in which the forms of
capitalism first developed, and the latter exemplified by all
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former and actual colonies in which capitalism was engendered by
acculturational contact with the primary societies.
1. The Condition of Dependency
It is therefore within the context and constraints of more
highly developed forms of capitalism that secondary capitalist
societies evolve their forms of capitalism. (This relationship
is often referred to as the "dependency" state, the "neocolo-
nialist relationship," "clientism," the "satellite-metropolis
relationship" and so forth). As the secondary country responds
to the primary country's evolution, it itself undergoes progres-
sional states of the national economy.
The condition of dependency has been defined by Bodenheimers
a situation in which the economy of a certain group of coun-
tries is conditioned by the development and expansion of
another economy, to which their own (economy) is subjected
.. an historical condition which shapes a certain structure
of the world economy such that it favors some countries to
the detriment of others and limits the de elopment possibi-
lities of the (subordinate) economies...
The export of raw material from the secondary country to
the primary one is a major feature of the dependency state. More
recently, heavier emphasis has shifted from materials to the
repatriation of profits, as the primary country discovers substi-
tutues for raw material, and as it increases its direct capital
inputs into the secondary country.
An outline of -the evolution of a capitalist-oriented
economy in the Philippines demonstrates its origins in accultu-
rational contact by direct colonisation with primary countries
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such as Spain and the United States. It indicates an export-
oriented economy built around a colonial landholding system and
marked by increasing foreign capital investments.
2. Patterns Set by Spanish Colonial Policy
The Philippines was first integrated into the international
economic system in its mercantile phase during the sixteenth cen-
tury when it became a colony of Spain. During three centuries as
an outpost of Spanish empire, the Philippines served primarily
as provider of raw materials and agricultural commodities and
functioned as an import-export enclave for the Spanish dominion.
The colony was exploited for its natural resources and human
labor through an infrastructure of dependency emanating from the
landholding system and an economic structure geared to the needs
of the colonizers. 5
Tributes and labor services of the Filipinos were the
chief economic support of Spanish rule until almost the close of
the 18th century. The religious orders, charitable groups, and
Spaniards were originally assigned encomiendas with the right to
collect the tributes of the natives living within the boundaries
of the grant, The word encomienda however was commonly used to
refer to the land itself and the encomenderos came to regard the
land as their own. What there was of the natives' landholdings
were frequently taken over by Chinese mestizos who had been assi-
milated into the local population. These plantation-sized hold-
ings of the religious corporations and the Filipino-Chinese were
the antecedents of the haciendas which have figured prominently
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in rice and sugar culture in the Philippines.
By the 1780s commercial export agriculture appeared and
land began to be systematically cultivated for surplus production
for trade. The government established a tobacco monopoly and
started shipments to Spain in 1783. Specialized cultivation of
sugar and abaca (hemp) also began about the same time in response
to the demand for these products from European trading companies
that had become interested in the Philippines' economic potential.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Filipinos
carried out a revolutionary movement for independence from Spain.
Their efforts in 1898 to overthrow the Spanish and to establish
an independent republic free from colonial rule was thwarted, how-
ever, by the United States' expansionist aims.
3. The Dependency Relationship Under American Colonial Rule
Capitalism was promoted and maintained in the Philippines
in an organized and systematic manner by the American colonizers
who took over the islands from Spain in 1898. The United States'
expansionist policy had recognized the economic advantages of
acquiring the Philippines by declaring war against Spain and
therefore gaining proximity to the huge and promising China
market. American aims of the period are depicted by a speech
by Senator Beveridge of Indiana to the Middlesex Club in Boston
on April 27, 1898. 6
American factories are making more than the American people
can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume.
Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world
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must and shall be ours. And we will get it as our mother
(England) has told us how. We will establish trading
posts throughout the world as distributing points for Ame-
rican products. We will soon cover the ocean with our mer-
chant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of our
greatness. Great colonies governing themselves, flying our
flag, and trading with us, will grow about our posts of
trade. Our institutions will fly on the wings of commerce.
And American law, American order, American civilization, and
the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto
bloody and benighted, but by these agencies of God hence-
forth to be made beautiful and bright.
The Philippines are logically our first target.
The search for dumping-grounds for American surplus pro-
duction was equated with America's manifest destiny to civilize
heathen peoples, with the Filipinos as the first targets. The
American colonizers disregarded the Philippine Revolutionary Move-
ment and the independent Philippine republic which they established;
instead the Americans labeled the Filipino nationalists as mere
"insurrectionists" who were subjugated only after a protracted
and bloody Filipino-American war. Taft defended the Roosevelt
administration's war against the rebelling Filipinos by insisting
that
the presence of the United States in the islands is
necessary... to secure civil rights to the people and to
aliens with vested interests
and that
the more we develop the islands, the more we teach the Filipi-
nos the methods of maintaining well-ordered government,
the more tranquility succeeds in the islands, the better
the business, the greater the products, and the more pro-
fitable the association with those islands in a business
way. 7
Once the Americans had succeeded in pacifying the Filipinos,
they took firm control of the economic policy of the country. The
typical dependency relationship developed between the US and the
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Philippines as the US increased its domination of Philippine
trade. While the Philippines exported agricultural products to the
US, it imported manufactured goods that its underdeveloped indus-
try could not produce. American investments during this time con-
centrated on the agricultural sector and on export processing --
effecting a lasting and retarding mark on the Philippines* indus-
trial growth.
With productive resources concentrated in producing for
the export market, the promotion of home consumption indus-
tries was neglected. Basic necessities, such as textiles and
even food products, formed a substantial portion of Philip-
pine imports. The free entry of American mass-produced goods
discouraged domestic manufacture of these and other consumer
products. Although production and income rose appreciably,
the foreign exchange surpluses and domestic savings realised
were not directed toward the long-term expansion and diversi-
fication and industrialisation could not be realised. Thus,
the Philippines inevitably continued to grow a ong the narrow
and lopsided confines of the colonial pattern.
4. Continued Dependency in an Independent Republic
In 1934 the US Congress scheduled the Philippines to be-
come a semi-autonomous commonwealth by November 1935 and then
fully independent on July 4, 1946. The issue of independence, how-
ever, was heavily determined by considerations of protecting Ame-
rican interests in the country.
For instance, two protective restrictions pertaining to
the exploitation of natural resources were incorporated by the
Filipinos into their Constitution, limiting exploitation of natural
resources to Filipino nationals. This attempt to protect the natio-
nal patrimony was tolerated by the Americans at the time, parti-
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cularly because of provisos that protected "existing" rights
which therefore shielded American holdings. In due time, how-
ever, as a result of pressure from the US, the measures were
amended to exempt American citizens and companies from the res-
trictions on natural resources development. After the establish-
ment of the Commonwealth in 1935 the Philippines continued to be
economically dependent and increasingly so on the US.
World War II devastated the Philippines, hitting cities
and infrastructure hardest. The US allocated some $620 million in
direct aid plus $1.4 billion of "technical assistance" -- but
made the aid conditional on Philippine acquiescence to the Philip-
pine Trade Act of 1946.
There was a basic assumption that Philippine economic revival
depended on restoring trade with the United States and sti-
mulating a flow of American investment into the islands. Thus
the Act established several incentives in hopes of attracting
new trade and capital, while re-establishing quotas and gua-
rantees for existing interests... These measures, designed to
restore Philippine production to prewar levels, continued the
undesirable effect of increasing Philippine reliance on Ame-
rican markets and limiting the diversification of goods pro-
duced for export. 9
As American war payments to the Philippines came to an
end, the Philippine government increasingly encountered a serious
balance-of-payments problem and tried to maintain the value of
peso. It imposed a set of exchange and import controls in 1949,
thereby effecting less imports, especially from the US, and Fili-
pinizing foreign exchange allocations and major economic functions.
During the period of controls, to avoid import and exchange con-
trols which limited their profits, US investors instead went into
Philippine manufacturing of the products of substitutes of products
which they could no longer profitably export to the Philippines.
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The value of American direct investment in Philippine manufac-
turing including petroleum refining is estimated by the US Dept.
of Commerce as having increased ninefold from $23 million in
1950 to $190 million in 1963.
The Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1955 encouraged the conti-
nued dependence of the Philippines on US markets. A declining
tariff schedule gave the Philippines longer periods of lesser
tariffs to stimulate production of export goods, while the US was
given longer periods of larger tariffs to protect domestic produ-
cers. The provision allowing possible future increases in the
American sugar quota for the Philippines was another concession
to Filipino interests that perpetuated dependence on the US mar-
ket. Finally, the agreement provided for the protection of US
businesses which were already established.
The United States continues to be the primary source of
direct private investment in the Philippines. Since 1950 with the
creation of parity rights and the decreasing trade advantages caused
by exchange and import controls, US investments have grown rapidly.
Between 1950 and 1972, total book value of US direct investment
rose 500 percent, with manufacturing increasing by more than 1200
percent. Foreign investment on the whole remains of major signifi-
cance to the Philippine economy:
As of 1970, 415 of the 900 largest corporations in the Philip-
pines had equity investment by foreign nationals, according
to a survey conducted by the Philippine government Inter-Agency Working Group on Foreign Investment. This survey found
that paid-in capital, including capitalized surplus plus
retained earnings, belonging to foreign nationals amounted to
P3.8 billion and was 39.7 percent of the total equity capital
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of the 900 firms. Of this foreign investment, 80 percent
is owned by Americans. Based on these statistics, Americans
own approximately one-third of all the total equity gapital
of the 900 largest corporations in the Philippines.
From the above discussion it can be gleaned that the
Philippine economy has been and continues to be embedded in the
international economic system as a dependent economy.
5. Wage-Price Structure
Typically, secondary or dependent economies are charac-
terized by wages which are quite low relative to prices and profits.
Where a major part of the national income arises from sale on ex-
ternal markets, there are rather restricted internal markets,
especially among the lower-income majority of the Filipino popu-
lation. Moreover, the maintenance of a steady low level of real
wages is intensified by long-term secular inflations.
Such a wage-price structure breeds the duality of the Fili-
pino labor market. The underemployment sector constituted by part-
time jobs, odd jobs, and all kinds of other "marginal" work com-
prise a system of getting around the constraints of the formal
labor market and its wage structure. Leeds also points out the
tendency in decline phases of the economy for the constriction of
the formal labor market, i.e., a decrease in the proportion of
the labor force gainfully employed in the formal labor market.
Analyses of Philippine data appear to bear out these characteris-
tics.
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Table 2: Real Wages in the Philippines (1962-1968) (%4
1962 101.30
1963 = 100 100.00
1964 86.86
1965 85.81
1966 89.01
1967 81.68
1968 88.08
Source: Sicat, Gerardo P. Economic 2licy and Philippine Develop-
ment, p. 422.
With a base of 100 in 1963, real wages are shown to have
fallen in the Philippines over the years, widening the gap bet-
ween the rich and the poor. Inflation remains unchecked: the con-
sumer price index rose 10% in 1957-61, by 24.8% in 1961-65 -
For about the same period, too, employment creation is
shown to be poor and slow, even in the manufacturing sector. When
compared with the base year 1962, employment index in 1966 for food
manufacturing increased by only 17% points: beverages and tobacco,
by 12%. Only four industry groups had higher employment figures
compared to 1962 (i.e., furniture and fixtures, wood and cork, tex-
tiles and chemical products.) All the other industries registered
lower employment indexes. Corollary studies alsho show that the
manufacturing sectors with the highest gain in productivity are
those who have also been displacing labor, in favor of more capi-
tal -- due to the policy bias toward capital-intensive rather
than labor-intensive industrial activity.
The Philippine economy today is plagued by spiralling
prices: the consumer price index for all items registered 223.5
points, (1965 = 100) in January 1974, while wages remain the same.
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The country is thus marked by a predominance of an under-
employed sector receiving income way below minimum-wage levels.
The economic policies which promote capital-intensive industries
and the substitution of capital for labor place a premium on high-
ly-skilled labor. Consequently, a great mass of relatively unskilled
are prevented from securing steady and gainful employment. Since
the mid-1950s the proportion of the labor force in manufacturing
has remained roughly constant at no more than 12 percent, and no
more than 5 percent of the labor force is in so-called "organized"
manufacturing, i.e., with five or more workers. The stagnant growth
of industrial employment forces a growing portion of the labor
force to go into relatively low-income, low- or non-productive
self-employment like many activities in the urban services trade.
...It is easy to cite examples of these activities which pro-
vide hand-to-mouth existence for the growing labor force. Note
the growing abundance of sidewalk or street hawking; of the
"fixing" of papers in government offices which involve minor
government clerks, thus helping to erode our own public ser-
vices; of the "watch your car" services at the restaurants
and city curbs; and of even begging. On the growth of men-
dicancy and urban poverty, notice that a great proportion of
new entrants in the begging and street hawking "trades" are
children. If parents have steady employment, there will be a
reduction of children self-employment in these non-productive
trades. Thus, for the large bulk of the labor force that seek
livelihood in the urban areas, life has increasingly become
more difficult. 13
6. The Trend Toward Greater Income Inequality
Why should the unequal distribution of economic opportunity
and income persist? In order to improve the income distribution
in the Philippines, one of two alternatives would have to occurs
either, a more equitable distribution of claims to the scarce fac-
tors of the economy, such as land, skills, and capital, as well as
access to new and better technology or, an increase in the share
of the national income representing the returns to the most
equally distributed factor -- unskilled labor. In the socioeconomic
structure that exists in the Philippines, a redistribution of
existing claims to scarce and valuable factors of production is not
likely to get very far. Improving the distribution of income would
hinge primarily on the possibility of increasing the share of
national income due to unskilled labor.
However, with the actual forces that impede the growth of
demand for unskilled labor and thus limit efforts to reduce unem-
ployment/underemployment and raise income, the share of total in-
come due to unskilled labor is unlikely to increase over time,
and therefore, income inequality is likely to persist, and even
worsen. Corresponding to the increasing income inequality will be
an increasing inequality in the distribution of sociopolitical power
as well.
C. SOCIO-POLITICAL VARIABLES
One of Leeds' main contentions is that the incidence of
squatter settlements is greatest in societies with certain typical
socio-political and administrative variables. He takes together
the operation of the political economy, the administrative system
and the juridical-constitutional system, and contends that these
operate in a way "as to maintain very profound social cleavages
such as class structures, caste systems, ethnic stratification,
and the like, hierarchically layered with respect to access to
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formal sources of power (legal manipulation of resources through
agencies of states organized "legitimate" forces formal control
over para-public national or quasi-national associations like
political parties, unions, and the like)." 14
1. Concentration of Power in a Small Elite
Philippine society is characterized by a class structure in
which power is highly concentrated among a small set of elites. Those
who constitute this elite are those whose power is associated with
the traditional sector and who constitute an aristrocracy of rela-
tively long standing, and those whose prominence is more recent and
associated with the growth of the modern sector and the independent
republic.
In the first group are included holders of land, wealthy
traders, and other pre-capitalist elites whose dominance in the
countryside was accepted and often strengthened by colonial rule.
During the three centuries of Spanish rule there emerged well-
defined economic and social classes who owned and directed a sub-
stantial part of economic wealth and social power, and who, for
the most part, exert the same influence in the country today. A
landlord class evolved as a result of land-settlement policy at
the beginning of Spanish rule. A group of Filipinos of royal
lineage under the pre-Spanish political organization of the islands
had also become major landowners. Another group of landowners
were the Chinese who had amassed wealth through their moneylending
and commercial activities. These groups constituted the elite who
wielded economic power at the end of Spanish rule in 1898, when the
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economy was largely agriculture-based and to a lesser extent
commerce-oriented.
As foreign trade grew, especially after the opening of the
Suez Canal in the late 1860s the merchant and landowning classes
became more powerful. Even as American commercial groups were
then already clamoring for a more aggressive trade policy in Asia,
the local merchant and landowning elite found the American design
fully acceptable. The US Consul in Manila, Oscar Williams, upon
hearing rumors of a likely war between Spain and the United States,
claimed in March 1898 that "the natives, half-breed, Chinese mer-
chants, and such Spaniards as were in business were all ready to
welcome our fleet, fight with it to hoist over these islands the
United States flag and swear allegiance to it, and once done, all
interests here would thrive, be settled and happy." 15
It was about this time too that the sugar industry had its
beginnings. When the Americans took control of the Philippines,
and as preferential free trade induced more rapid expansion of
primary exports, sugar and coconut products dominated the economic
picture. The sugar-producing class whose plantation agriculture
was large-scale soon formed a powerful and cohesive interest
group. Coconut interests were also heavily supported by the sugar
bloc because of their larger common interest -- access to the
huge American market.
As early as 1920, when the question of Philippine indepen-
dence was being debated in the US Congress, reactions from the
sugar and other primary-products groups explicated their desire to
maintain the preferential relationship with the US. Numerous peti-
tions to the American government vigorously opposed any American
withdrawal from the islands and called for dropping any further
consideration of independence for at least twenty years. The peti-
tions came mainly from "the great sugar planters of the southern
provinces, who realize that the prosperity and indeed the very
existence of their trade depends upon continued connection with
the United States." 16
The dominance of the sugar and other primary exporting
interests in Philippine politics was counterbalanced by the growth
of industrial interests in the 1950s, but these groups still
constitute a very strong force in guiding economic policy today,
particularly in the determination of trade relations with the US.
The elite whose power is associated with the modern sector
and the independent government include the established foreigners
and emerging nationals, the highly-educated and Westernized pro-
fessionals, the bureaucrats and military officers who have taken
over from their colonial predecessors.
As a result of the government's promotion of industrializa-
tion through protectionist policies, a new industrial class emerged
in the 1950s. Although the new industrial groups counterbalanced
the powerful traditional sector in questions of economic policy,
the opposition between the two groups were never substantial. Those
who had been attrai;rated to invest in the new and profitable ven-
tures were largely nationals from the traditional moneyed sectors
previously engaged in commerce, finance, and traditional exports.
including the sugar-associated interests. Their already advantaged
position gave these groups enough flexibility to reap rewards on
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both sides of the stream as they provided the finance and entre-
preneurship for the new industries. On the other hand, the alien
component of the new industrial class were those interests which
had already enjoyed a market for products exported from their
home countries, and which sought to bypass import controls by
establishing industries based in the Philippines to produce pre-
vious export products. The industrial sector was thus marked by
numerous joint ventures between Filipinos and foreign investors,
largely American, or Filipino-owned enterprises under license
agreements with foreign corporations, or alien-controlled esta-
blishments.
The social and economic dominance of the the landowning
and the industrial elite continues and becomes stronger to this
day. As Weisskopf points out:
Such a class structure in turn results in a state apparatus
that is largely controlled by and responsive to the interests
of the elites -- no matter what the formal nature of the
political systems. Because of their overwhelming power and 7prestige, the elites form a relatively cohesive ruling class...
The dominant interest groups exercise their political in-
fluence not only through political offices in the legislative and
executive departments, but largely through the office of the
President himself. Since the Philippine constitutional framework
allows for a highly-centralized organization of decisionmaking
at the top executive level, the President is perhaps the most
important source of political patronage. In exchange for the
substantial logistical backing given to their chosen candidate,
the powerful social and economic interests, domestic and alien,
36
obtain assurances that their interests will be protected and pro-
moted. Sicat explains the exceptionally broad powers of the
Philippine President over economic policies:
He is able to adjust tariff rates within a wide range
under authorization of Congress. He is able to influence
through his personal leadership the decisions of the Central
Bank and of the large government financial institutions.
In fact,...presidential influence on monetary policy is pro-
bably decisive. Given the highly personalized structure of
Philippine politics, it has been argued by some observers
that the President has been inclined to reward his business
supporters significantly more than those who have supported
the opposition. The main instrument in differentiating
favor is access to the credit facilities of large governmen-
tal institutions. 18
2. The Power of the President
It is widespread belief among nationalistic elements in
the Philippines that the President's declaration of martial law
in September 1972 was precipitated by pressures from foreign
and domestic power interests* Social unrest and "subversive"
activity had been spreading among disenchanted intellectuals
and students as well as urban workers and organized peasant groups
as the economic situation progressively deteriorated. Nationalist
legislation was also emerging from the Philippine Congress and
the Supreme Court was issuing rulings less and less favorable
to protected American interests. President Marcos himself cited
subversion, rebellion, deteriorating peace and order as growing
threats to the security of the nation, and therefore as justifi-
cation for the imposition of martial law. Certainly the most
articulate supporters of the new administration have been economic
interests like the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philip-
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pines. The American press has ran articles on the President's
assurances to American investors that their privileged positions
in the Philippines would be protected rather than curtailed,
even after their scheduled termination in July 1974.
Today the martial-law regime extends substantial advan-
tages to foreign investors in areas like oil exploration, mining
expansion, and the creation of a free-trade zone for foreign-
owned export industries, by which it hopes to attract even more
foreign participation in the economy.
The situation encouraged in the Philippines today by the
economic policies of the martial law administration bear out the
increasing dependence of contemporary Philippines on the dominant
American interests. For similar reasons the government has become
increasingly dependent upon the US for political and military
support, in training and expanding the armed forces, and in
"counterinsurgency activities".
3. Institutional Constraints on Choices of Urban Poor Families
The continued dominance of the powerful elite groups en-
courages the continued pattern of economic growth which contri-
bute a significant parameter to the urban housing situation. The
nature of the political economy not only maintains the deep social
cleavages in Filipino society but also the marked inequalities
in wealth and power. In the face of spiralling inflation and a
regressive tax system, the socioeconomic structure operates to
concentrate the financial and material resources even more toward
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the elite.
It can be concluded that the total social system is so
structured as to limit the choices and strategies that low-income
Filipinos can use to solve their various problems of living. In
the words of Leeds, an economic structure such as that in the
Philippines
..is such as to create and maintain very large aggregates
of persons with relatively very small incomes. Their pro-
blem very simply, is how to make these small resources do for
food, housing, education, clothing, medicine, recreation,
and all the other aims that people in contemporary society
have. Within these aims, they must and do set priorities,
food being primary always, and secondary ones al rnating
among education, housing, health, and clothing...
Low-income households in Philippine urban areas thus set
priorities for themselves within the framework of the economic
and sociopolitical constraints which they encounter: the limited
opportunities to earn a living; the slow expansion af the labor
market; the tax and other benefits to business, industry, and
civil construction which result in differential regional and
local opportunity structures; their access to social welfare
services, education, and so forth. Hollnsteiner's studies indi-
cate the framework within which the slum and squatter families
of Manila set priorities for living, as in the choice of residen-
tial location.
A 1971 lower-income lifestyle survey of 250 low-income
families in Vitas, Tondo, of whom about one-fifth (19%)
are squatters, reveals that several criteria, not just
that of squalor versus cleanliness and order, influence the
choice of residence. The squatter's perceptions of his
current environment, and ultimately, his decisions vis-a-vis
family location emerge in the context of his past experience,
future expectations, and more directly in terms of often
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shrewd and highly rational calculations as to wgre the
best opportunities for him and his family lie.
Specifically, faced with a housing market that cannot
supply enough standard housing at costs related to real incomes,
the strategy of these low-income families is to avoid such a
housing market altogether. They settle on land which for some
reason have fallen outside active use, e.g., railroad rights-of-
way, riverbanks, esteros (shallow river tributaries) and undeve-
loped government and private lands. To speak of an aggregate of
low-income persons avoiding the formal urban housing market is
consequently to speak of the formation of squatter and slum housing.
The very low levels of income found among urban squatters
is attested to by a number of surveys and research studies under-
taken by local and foreign groups. The studies indicate that the
decision to come to the city and to reside in the central city
(despite the poor housing environment) are consequences of the
priority given to locating residence near income-earning opportu-
nities and to basic necessities like water, schools, health ser-
vices, etc.
Studies of consumption patterns among squatter families in
the Manila area show a significant portion of family income spent
on food -- again suggesting the priority given to essential survi-
val needs. Those earning more (P500 a month or more) spend about
40-50% of income on food, while those earning less (less than P150
21
a month) may spend as much as 85-95% of their income on food alone.
Thus, the need for income-earning opportunities has been a con-
stant priority expressed by families interviewed in surveys.
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In describing the general profile of households in Barrio
Magsaysay in Tondo, Manila, Laquian says:
...All in all, life in Barrio Magsaysay seemed to belie the
misery and poverty that one assumes upon seeing the place.
A full 67 percent of the families interviewed owned the
houses they were living in. The 26.6 percent who were
renting paid only small amounts (70.3 percent paid less than
P15 a month), while some people did not even pay any rent
at all. Most households had good lighting facilities; 65.1
percent used electric lights. Some 42.8 percent of those
studied owned radios. The main things that people com plained
about were the lack of water, roads, and toilet facilities.
With conditions being what they were, a full 72.5 percent
of those'studied in Barrio Magsaysay were unwilling to move
out of the place. Only 17.7 percent were willing to move
out, and many of these expected the government to assist them
in such an effort. In fact, many of those interviewed were
willing to pay for the lands they were squatting on.
Reasons for staying in the place and refusing to move out
were many, but 19.2 per cent said they had no other place to
go; 17.3 percent because it was near their place of work;
16.3 percent because the place was nice and peaceful; and
11.9 percent, because it was cheap to live in Barrio Mag-
saysay. It was obvious from these answers that most of the
people were happ where they were and unwilling to move to
other places.
Hollnsteiner's study reveals parallel perceptions of squatter
families in the Manila area:
... (T)he solutions that squatters choose reflect active
rather than passive, or belt-tightening strategies -- notably
more so thatn solutions proposed by the other groups (i.e,
non-squatter groups). Thus, they want to look for jobs or
better-paying jobs, are considering engaging in small-scale
industries, going to school or moving elsewhere in search of
opportunity; only 1 in 10 opts for adjusting needs to avail-
able resources. Nonetheless, a sobering 30 percent, still
the lowest among the four groups, say no solutions are avail-
able, reply they don't know what to do, or simply give no
answer.
...Difficult as city life can be, it offers him more than the
stagnant countryside of former days did. It also offers work
and income opportunities that relocation sites far from the
city cannot. 23
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From indications in the findings of recent studies, housing
policymakers can also look at a substantial proportion of squatter
housing as rentless housing in private ownership, resulting in
savings. As a secondary housing market quite outside the formal
urban housing market, rent-free squatting allows poor households
to better cope with crises ahd with the inflationary economy out-
side the community. What savings the families accumulate from
nonpayment of rent and from retaining their homes can be conver-
ted in values at the time of crisis or sale. For other poorer
squatter residents whose income are still sto negligible that even
this form of savings is impossible, the squatter settlement is a
refuge from rents which would consume what they need simply to
eat.
4. Summary
What I have tried to demonstrate in the preceding discus-
sion is that the formation of slum and squatter settlements --
identified commonly as the urban housing problem -- constitute
the response made by low-income families to the socio-economic
realities which they encounter in city life. The specific urban
situations in which they find themselves are in turn inextricably
linked to the larger sociopolitical and economic conditions pre-
vailing in the country. Among the economic parameters that have
been related to the urban housing situation are the following:
(1) land shortage and land-price manipulation arising from
uncontrolled private ownership of urban lands;
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(2) the dependent state of the economy, characterized by the
export of a few traditional agricultural commodities, the
heavy influx of foreign investments, and an industrial
sector biased toward capital-intensive, import-substituting
industries and biased against labor-intensive and more
diversified production.
(3) a pattern of economic growth which cannot adequately acce-
lerate the productive capacities of the Philippines, par-
ticularly in the manufacturing sector, because of restric-
ted internal markets and inability to compete in world
markets; which cannot keep with the growing consumption
needs of the burgeoning population, and which cannot
generate enough employment to absorb the expanding labor
force;
(4) the duality of the labor market into the regularly employed
earning a stable income, and those underemployed in
marginal services earning little and intermittently.
The sociopolitical context of the Philippine urban housing
situation has also been outlined in a discussion of the elite
groups who have initiated and maintained the economic conditions.
The unequal distribution of economic opportunity, income,
and political power reflects itself in the unequal distribution
of housing services enjoyed by the urban population. As will be
shown in an analysis of government housing policy in the next
chapter, such policies have been skewed toward benefitting those
with stronger sociopolitical positions (generally those with high-
er incomes) and less toward housing the lowest-income families who
are in direst need of housing services.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PHILIPPINE HOUSING POLICY: WHAT AND FOR WHOM?
This section examines what is recognizably Philippine
housing policy -- as explicated in Congressional documents,
national four-year development plans, and reports on housing
action by government. The various projects and policies are
studied in terms of three considerations: what housing services
the programs effect; who benefits from these services; and how
efficiently the services are extended to the intended benefi-
ciaries.
rPhilippine housing policy's stated aim is to extend housing
services to Filipinos in need of housing by stimulating the pro-
duction of more dwelling units and by enabling the population to
purchase the housing they need at prices they can afford. Such a
policy objective is potentially a very strong instrument for dis-
tributing housing services in such a way as to narrow the gap
between the rich minority who are luxuriously-housed and the poor
majority who are ill-housed.
The main contention in this chapter, however, is that, in
actuality, Philippine housing policy is contrary to its stated
objective, and blatantly maintains instead the disparities in
housing services extended to poor families as against rich fami-
lies, and perpetuates the disparities in wealth and power among
the population.
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Government housing efforts are neatly categorized by
planners into what they term "social housing" and "economic
housing." Social housing is used to refer to projects entailing
direct government subsidy to the lowest-income families -- gene-
rally residents of urban slum and squatter areas. Economic
housing is used to refer to projects which more or less follow
the operations of the open housing market -- building for an
existing market who can pay for not only the entire cost of high-
quality housing, but also for an attractive return to investors.
A. SOCIAL HOUSING
Under its so-called social housing program, the Philippine
government claims to build and finance housing for the lower-
income urban households who now comprise 65% of urban households,
who cannot conceivably afford "decent" housing because of their
limited earnings. More specifically, social housing is the govern-
ment's approach to dealing with slum and squatter areas in the
urban centers. To date, social housing has meant the razing of
slum and squatter communities, and the transfer of the evicted
families to relocation sites outside the city or to high-rise tene-
ments constructed in the central city. Underlying the scheme is the
premise that slums and squatter areas must be eliminated from the
urban scene in outright physical terms, because they are an eye-
sore and a threat to the stability of the urban community. Per-
haps incidental to the motive of clearing slums and squatters is
the slight expectation that the environmental situations of the
families themselves might improve.
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1. Resettlement
Because of its seeming simplicity and inexpensiveness, the
relocation of slum and squatter families to areas outside the
metropolitan area is generally considered to be a very favorable
approach. A few thousand families at a time are compelled by
government authorities to disassemble their houses under threat
that bulldozers and wrecker crews and the police will not allow
their homes to remain standing. The evicted families are trans-
ferred by hired trucks from the city to an undeveloped site
hardly accessible from the city center. Little provision, if any,
for water, light, sanitation, and other basic facilities are
extended at the new site. The families are simply assigned lots
on which to construct their shelters from the debris of their
old homes. Perhaps the single item that is assured them are the
lots, for which they must pay on a long-term deferred-payment
basis. The lack of too many life needs are found intolerable by
many families, who are enticed to sell their "rights" (although
illegally) to speculators, return to the city to squat elsewhere.
An illustration of this pattern is described by Laquian of the
earlier relocation of squatter families to the Sapang Palay site
outside metropolitan Manila.
In December 1963 about 5,975 families from the central
city districts of Intramuros, North Harbor, Malate and Ermita
were relocated by the City Government of Manila to Sapang
Palay, a hilly place owned by the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation, located about 37 kilometers outside Manila.
As in former relocation projects there were inadequate pro-
visions for houses, water, roads, electricity, transportation,
food, medical services, and other amenities. Many men and
women who were formerly earning in Manila were transformed
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into dependents. Those who continued to work in Manila had to
spend about 20 percent of their income for transportation
alone. Children's schooling was interrupted. By August 1966
only 2,800 families of the original relocated families were
still in Sapang Palay. The rest had gone back to Manila and
suburbs, though they maintain ghost houses in the relocation
area, in the hope that the government decides to distribute
the lands free or that some pspeculators would want to buy
their "rights" to the lots.
Hollnsteiner similarly contends that life in the resettle-
ment sites for most families is still far too difficult and still
beyond their economic means. She emphasizes that although the
relocation site may offer physically healthier environments in
some ways, it cannot provide the opportunities which industry,
transportation, and service jobs in the central city can provide.
Despite the lowered commuter fares between Manila and the Sapang-
Palay and Carmona resettlements, the families usually still cannot
afford the P1 roundtrip fare when they earn an unsure P3 to P8
a day in the city. The consequences become evident in the high
abandonment rates found in the resettlement areas, as reported in
government statistics that an average of 550 families left Sapang
Palay each year over a six-year period (1963-1969) -- a total of
60 percent of the original relocated families. 2
The evidence suggests that the government's relocation
efforts by and large do not solve the squatter and slum housing
problem, even in the very narrow sense of eliminating such low-
income settlements from the urban scene. Government authorities
generally disregard the magnitude of the real costs of relocation,
not only to government, but more importantly, to the families
affected. The costs of the bundle of the necessary housing ser-
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vices are almost completely ignored. Temporary shelter, water,
electricity, sanitation, transportation to and from work, medical
services and other community facilities are only partially
provided for, if at all.
More basic is that the relocation areas have no adequate
economic base to provide employment for the resettled families.
The breadwinners who continue to work in the central city do so
only by paying high commuting costs. Relocation has reduced family
income not only by limiting the earning opportunities of the
families. It has also imposed the additional financial burden of
land payments -- payments which many families are unable or unwil-
ling to meet. To escape this financial obligation which accompany
less acceptable living conditions, many families sell their rights
to the land and return to the city.
Thus far therefore, relocation has not benefitted the poor
in any lasting way. In most cases relocation has only worsened
the plight of the affected families. Instead, those who have
benefitted from the projects include land speculators for whom
land on easy terms has been made available by resettled families
who are eager to dispose of their property.
2. On-Site Public Housing
In a few instances slum clearance has led to on-site housing
as seen in the tenement housing projects put up in central-city
districts of Tondo and Pandacan in Manila where squatters and
slumdwellers are unusually dense. In theory, the intention was to
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re-house the squatters living around the area in tenement apart-
ments without transferring them far from their original place of
residence. In actual practice, the projects benefitted evicted
families little. For example, political pressure affected the
allocation of apartments in favor of government employees, or
squatters who were not even from the area, at the expense of
families for whom the projects were supposedly undertaken. Again,
rehoused families found it difficult to meet regular payments,
and were therefore persuaded to sell their "rights of occupancy"
to higher-income people who found the low rents attractive. Many
original tenants have gone back to squatting, and those who have
remained in the tenement buildings include families who are
actually outside the qualified group of family income groups
earning no more than P500 a month.
Moreover, the projects have been chronically plagued
with inadequate water supply, poor maintenance and management,
overcrowding, and inefficient rent collection. In an in-depth
study of the Punta multi-storey housing project, Ramos found
very low living standards in the project?
...The comments of the tenants and the writer's personal
observations and analysis show much evidence to demonstrate
that very low standards, in matters of health and livability,
have been used at the Punta project. It is clear that the
physical and social aspects of the design have not been well
suited to the needs of the peppl# who are intended to be
accomodated in this project, ?or4 despite the claim of 76
percent of the sample that their accomodations in the project
were better than their former ones, at least 87 percent would
like to move out if they had a chance. In addition, conside-
ring some specific features of the project, a measure of
satisfaction revealed that at least 50 percent of the families
interviewed were dissatisfied with their present living con-
ditions. While the residents enjoyed the very low rents com-
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pared with other types of housing, their major complaints
were lack of water supply, height of building, noise, and
garbage disposal. Other physical inconveniences, like
crowding, lack of privacy, and lack of storage facilities,
were caused by the very tight area limitations set by the
planners.
Lack of pride and responsibility on the part of the tenants
was also shown. The project, although only three years old,
was unsightly and showed definite signs of wear and disrepair.
A very poor standard of public services, coupled with poor
building maintenance and repair procedures, has added to
this unpleasant situation.
On further analysis, too, on-site housing as carried out
by government has been an extremely costly venture, not only to
construct but to continue subsidizing. Ramos found that high-rise
construction has turned out to be a poor economic venture, not
only on initial capital investment and operating costs, but also
in terms of the financial losses accruing to government because
of the low rents and poor rent collection. The construction of
the Punta project was found to be at least one and a half times
more costly than if the government had instead put up single-
family or low-rise housing -- the type preferred by a large majo-
rity of the rehoused families. Ramos has urged discontinuation of
similar high-rise public housing schemes.
B. SOCIAL HOUSING EVALUATED
In both relocation and on-site public housing, squatter
families were evicted from their original places of residence and
compelled to transfer to supposedly more desirable dwelling envi-
ronments. However, family incomes remained low and unstable; for
the resettled families, the result was even lower and more unstable
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incomes. For both re-housed and resettled families, their new
places of residence imposed additional financial obligations on
them. While the proportion of their incomes paid for housing
increased, their incomes remained the same or were reduced. Thus,
in terms of the distribution of housing benefits, the squatter
families did not receive substantial benefits at all. In many
cases, they became worse off than before, and they were quick to
return to their previous practice of squatting. Those who even-
tually benefitted were limited, including unqualified tenement
occupants and property-rights holders whose larger incomes or
stronger political connections, gave them access to the rights to
occupancy or land ownership.
Basic to the weakness of the program is the ineffectual
administrative organization charged with planning and implementing
the program. The Presidential Assistant on Housing and Resettlement
Agency, created in 1964 to coordinate housing and urban develop-
ment in the country, suffers from lack of competent staff, inade-
quate funding, and substantial political interference. The People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation, authorized by law to acquire
land, build houses, manage housing projects, clear slums, relocate
squatters and undertake research, is drastically weakened by
chronic financial difficulties. It has also been subjected to heavy
political pressures, resulting for instance in the depletion of
PHHC landholdings, as these were rechanneled for special housing
projects for government employees, veterans, newspapermen, and
so on, or for other special non-residential purposes of politically-
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powerful interests. The undermining of the administrative effec-
tiveness of these housing agencies reflect the lack of serious-
ness of purpose of government in providing urban poor families
the basic housing services they so badly need.
C. ECONOMIC HOUSING
The economic housing program of the government is carried
out primarily by home-financing assistance extended by the major
government financing institutions -- the Government Service Insu-
rance System (GSIS), the Social Security System (SSS), and the
4Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
a. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) -
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) functions
as a source of construction loans to subdivision companies for
land development and housing construction and (si source of mort-
gage funds to enable GSIS members (who are regular government
employees) to purchase house-and-lot units. Loans amount to up
to 80% of the appraised value of the collateral (provided in
terms of an unemcumbered homesite), with a maximum repayment
period of 25 years. The amount of the loan is further limited
to the repaying capability of the borrower. For members of the
GSIS the interest rate is 6% for loans up to P30,000. For loans
over P30,000 and for non-members, the rate is 9%.
Interim development loans are also extended to private
land developers to finance land development and homeqtruction.
Under this scheme, housing units are in turn allocated to indi-
vidual or group buyers under mortgage terms similar to that of
GSIS inidividual loans.
As of June 30, 1970 54% of total GSIS investments -- over
1 billion pesos -- represented real estate mortgage loans, which
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include housing loans as well as loans granted to commercial and
industrial construction activities.
b. Social Security System (SS) -
The SSS, established in 1957 to operate a retirement and
personal benefit program for employees of private firms, is autho-
rized to use up to 40% of its investible funds to grant mort-
gage loans to its members. Loans are payable over a maximum period
of 25 years at interest rates of 6% for direct loans and 7% for
loans guaranteed by the Home Financing Commission.
Under its workers' housing program, SSS grants interim
development loans to private developers and housing contractors
with a maximum three-year repayment term at 12% interest per annum.
The completed project is then purchased by SSS and allocated to
qualified homebuying members, from whom mortgage payments are
collected through payroll deductions.
Since the start of its housing loan program in 1958 the
SSS has released to its member-borrowers as of December 31, 1971
a total of 539 million pesos representing 43% of its total invest-
ment and the highest in its portfolio.
c. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) -
The Development Bank of the Philippines deals largely
with agro-industrial loans, and its housing investment is there-
fore limited -- confined to low-cost dwellings and fire victims.
During the five-year period 1967-1971, its lending operations
for housing averaged only P10.4 million in favor of 1,870 bor-
rowers per year. Towards specifically urban housing, it has exten-
ded only P3.8 million to 914 families in the Manila area. Loans
of P5-7 thousand are granted to non-homeowners for the construc-
tion of a house substantially in accordance with the plans and
specifications prepared by the DBP, repayable over 10-15 years
at 8% interest per annum on the outstanding balance.
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d. National Housing Corporation (NHC) -
The most ambitious government housing action is perhaps
the creation of the National Housing Corporation in June 1968
"to assist and carry out the coordinated massive housing pro-
gram of the government principally but not limited to low-cost
housing." It was capitalized at 100 million pesos contributed
equally by* the SSS, GSIS, DBP and the Philippine National
Bank.
The corporation is not only bogged down by its history
of charges of anomalies pointing to the enrichment of certain
officials involved in its creation. It suffers from huge tech-
nical difficulties which have prevented it from operating at
full capacity to this day. The NHC had intended to supply pre-
fabricated individual or multiple-unit houses to any party own-
ing a minimum of 150 sq.m. of land in urban areas and 100 sq.m.
in rural areas. The Corporation purchased an integrated Middle-
brand complex which was supposed to manufacture about 80% of
the total material requirements for the houses, turned out at
the rate of 12,000 units per year. Pre-fab homes costing P6,000
or less were to be sold on long-term installments to lower-income
families for as low as P42 a month, payable in 25 years. Because
it encounters too many technical difficulties, however, the plant
has not produced housing components at substantially lower
costs, and still has to seek markets for its products among
higher-cost construction projects, among them projects financed
by the SSS and GSIS. Until 1971 the plant was only operating at
a little more than 20 percent of its capacity, although replace-
metn of some of its production lines may soon raise this capacity.
D. EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC HOUSING
The most glaring shortcoming of past government efforts in
economic housing is the very limited number of beneficiaries, due
again to the skewed distribution of housing assistance toward
more affluent families. Most housing assistance is directed to
members of the GSIS and the SSS, who totalled about 3 million in
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1969 -- hardly a third of the tdal labor force.
Considering that low levels of income still prevail among
even this sector of the regularly-employed labor force, and con-
sidering that the SSS and GSIS require high paying capacities
for housing loans, it is evident that relatively very few SSS
and GSIS members actually enjoy the benefits made available
by these institutions. Those with larger incomes and with land
to build on are chosen over those with lower incomes or without
land to build on. Since single-detached housing financed by SSS
or GSIS generally costs a minimum of F17,500, only families
earning over P6,000 annually can conceivable afford to pay for
such housing under GSIS and SSS mortgage terms. In fact findings
of studies on lending policies of these institutions bear out
the proposition that the majority of their members who belong
to lower-income categories in effect subsidize the housing bene-
fits of the fewer, higher-income members. 5
During 1962-1972, the GSIS funds were used by 46,000 members
borrowers, whose average loan was about P23,000. Their number
equalled about 8 percent of the total GSIS 1970 membership,
and their average monthly income was within the range of P500-
0800, which puts them among the highest earning 20 percent of
all Filipino families.
...The record of the SSS is not much better. SSS estimates
that most loans go to families having income of P500-800
per month.
SUMMARY
In answer to the question posed in the title of this section:
housing policy: what and for whom? we summarize the issues by
which Philippine housing policy can be evaluated.
In general, the policy has largely ignored the redistri-
butional effects of government action, the net result of which
has been a strategy to house the urban rich rather than the poor.
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Because the orientation is to build for those who can
afford it, the emphasis remains on the construction of new high-
standard units with a full complement of housing services, built
on previously undeveloped urban land. Middle-income and upper-
income homebuyers are generally already homeowners who wish to
move into new homes of higher standards. As there has been no
effectively-enforced ceiling on housing loans, scarce funds of
financing institutions have often been channelled disproportionately
to luxury housing, instead of to substantially improved old housing.
The government chooses to disregard the fact that lower-
income families can also afford better homes, given the same assist-
ance extended to higher-income groups, and in some instances
even within the competitive housing market. Public policy gives
little or no regard for the improvement of existing substandard
housing or assisting lower-income families in home improvement
efforts. No other alternatives are given to poor families except
relocation or tenement housing.
Even if construction of new housing continues to be the
thrust of housing policy, more serious efforts to reduce construc-
tion and development costs must be undertaken, and this so far
has not been achieved. Broad outlines for lowering costs have
been suggested: "reducing area per family; use of cheaper
materials; economical plans and designs; economical construction
methods -- new and more efficient techniques, more production,
modular coordination" -- but so far have not gone beyond gene-
ralized recommendations. Again it must be remembered that even
proposals by private developers for minimizing land inputs per
dwelling unit, softening the high cost of financing, and encou-
raging "economies of scale" by mass pre-fabrication of components
are in general geared to housing those who can pay for the
housing made available. Reduction in housing costs achieved through
the means suggested will mean more an advantage for the relatively
well-off who already have substantial resources to begin with,
rather than become an advantage for families who will remain priced
out of the housing market.
The orientation to the competitive market is reflected
in the fact that housing finance is considered not so much appro-
priations from government revenue but rather as part of the invest-
ment portfolio of government financing institutions. Since much of
housing construction and land development is undertaken by private
developers (who utilize government funds in the form of construc-
tion loans), stimulating the country's activity in housing heavily
depends on incentives to private initiative. Profit ends, rather
than rational land-use planning, determine the choice of sites
for building. Government for instance has sold prime residential
sites to private parties for purposes of raising funds, and builds
on remaining land available to it -- no matter how far from the
city center -- rather than build housing on more accessible sites
it can retain or acquire.
The rationale of public housing policy is such that it does
not matter much whether the low-income majority of urban families
can or cannot afford the high-standard, high-cost dwellings that
private builders as well as government insist on producing. The
National Housing Corporation's product line reflects this mis-
guided orientation well.
The NHC's stated purpose was to carry out a massive low-
cost housing program through mass prefabrication of housing compo-
nents. Its plant complex produces concrete wall panels, polyvinyl
(PVC) tiles, particle chipboard wall panels, and woodwork. Its
inability to operate at full capacity is due not only to technical
operating difficulties, but also to a limited demand for its
products. It is not sufficiently competitive to garner a chunk of
the higher-cost construction in the country, neither is it eco-
nomical enough to find a market among the low-income families for
whom it was supposedly established in the first place.
Finally, Philippine housing policy has focused mainly on
the production of dwelling units alone, rather than on the provi-
sion of the bundle of housing services that accompany "decent
housing". More precisely, government tends to implement a double
standard: one standard for the well-off which provides both housing
units and a full range of services; another standard for the poor
wherein dwelling units are more often not provided, and services
are negligible. The lack of attention given to housing services
collectively result in government inaction in providing urban
services such as good roads, water, sanitation facilities to
even already-existing settlements in the city, particularly those
peopled by low-income urban families.
Such a pattern of distribution of housing benefits corres-
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ponds to the more general pattern of income distribution among
the population. The economic and sociopolitical institutions
that have been outlined in preceding sections are shown to ope-
rate in the formulation of housing policy so as to maintain
the prevailing societal structure even in the settlement patterns
of the population.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY TO HOUSING THE POOR
A. BASIC ISSUES
To arrive at an alternative approach to housing the
urban poor, this paper has attempted to first develop a perspec-
tive of the urban housing situation, different from the tradi-
tional sectoral view of housing as a problem of mass-producing
minimum-standard housing units. All along, the proposition has
been that the housing situation is part of the economic and socio-
political processes in the Philippines.
Unlike past housing policy, an alternative strategy must
recognize the functional influence of (1) the form and state of
the economy, (2) the distribution of wealth and power among Fili-
pinos, and (3) the pattern of urban economic growth, and so forth,
on the urban settlement pattern. While past policy has conformed
to the context and limitations set by the historical pattern of
economic and sociopolitical development, the alternative has to
be one which attempts to overcome the constraints imposed by the
dominant economic and sociopolitical institutions in order to
effectively carry out the objective of ensuring adequate shelter
for every Filipino family.
The alternative therefore should operate on three levels:
(1) on the level of specific, immediate alternatives for
providing more and better housing services to low-income urban
families at costs related to their resources;
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(2) on the level of broad alternatives for guided urban growth
and regional development;
(3) on the level of over-all policies toward accelerating
national development and equitably distributing the benefits of
development among the population.
Essentially, the strategy would be to simultaneously
accelerate the advance of low-income families in the socioeconomic
integration process, i.e., to increase their effective participa-
tion in the national economy and polity, and also harness their
resources by organizing and accelerating their spontaneous hous-
ing activity. Such a strategy is premised on families pursuing
their own "housing solution" through a gradual process of improve-
ment, with or without, oftentimes in spite of, public interven-
tion, according to the family's productive participation in
the economy and in the decisionmaking processes of the polity.
The same issues by which past housing policy has been
examined are the same issues which an alternative strategy must
contend with. Underlying the alternative approach would be an
essential concern with the distributional effects, with effect-
ing more and better housing services for the urban poor majority
at costs related to their incomes, distributing housing services
among as wide a sector as possible, and allowing for the maximum
upward mobility of lowest-income families.
The strategy would redefine standards for the quality of
housing, differentiating between necessities and amenities, and
among different requirements for differing life situations. The
aim, for one, is to effect the largest possible net gain in the
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urban housing stock, not only through new construction, but also
through home improvement schemes, rather than to merely replace
one-to-one homes which are demolished in slum and squatter areas.
The strategy would direct policies primarily at the demand
side, and only secondarily at the supply side. It would thus
channel government support directly to the poorest families rather
than rely on filtering. As such, it would operate almost indepen-
dently of the competitive housing market, using instead the pri-
vate capital and initiative of poor families themselves, streng-
thened by government support. Finally, the strategy for housing
the urban poor would apply the same standard applied to housing
the relatively rich: it would be designed to progressively provide
residential services collectively, rather than be limited to
producing dwelling units alone. Corollary to the above issues is
the rationalization of urban land policy in order to guarantee
an adequate supply of urban land for development purposes at
reasonable cost.
B. SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES: SITES-AND-SERVICES DEVELOPMENT
One immediate alternative for more and better housing for
urban poor families is sites-and-services development in both
new areas outside the central city as well as in already-esta-
blished settlements in the central city.
It is akin to recent government efforts in resettlement
areas like Sapang Palay and Carmona, where transportation faci-
lities, roads, schools and health services have been installed
to service the families living there. It is in sharp contrast
to what government did (or did not do) when they first established
these resettlement sites.
Whereas basic services and community facilities are
only recently being provided to resettled families in these two
areas, only after an interval of five to ten years between their
transfer and the provision of services, the alternative calls
for development of basic infrastructure (such as water, sanitation,
transportation) prior to or during transfer of families as well
as progressive provision of other community families.
In new settlement areas, as in those already planned
for by government authorities in other outlying areas of Manila,
the strategy should entail the preparation and development of
land to facilitate construction of houses by the resettled
families, including provisions for varying combinations and
sequences of public utilities and community facilities.
Characteristically the components would be:
(1) Building plots -- described in terms of size, density
of project, location in relation to employment and other urban
services.
(2) Public utilities -- ranging from basic utilities (water,
sanitation, transportation) to other desirable facilities
(electricity, paved roads, public lighting, gas installations,
etc.)
(3) Basic community facilities -- consisting of local
urban services which act as a link to the larger array of
government and private services such as schools, small busines-
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ses, markets, shops, police and fire protection, cultural
centers, social welfare centers (clinics, employment agencies,
nursery schools, day-care, etc.)
The range of legal and financial relationships between
the government and the households concerned can go from very
narrow to very broad. The specific terms of plot use, tenure,
and cost burdens as well as schedule of payments, for example,
can be flexible, and tailored to specific households' demonstrated
savings ability and capacityf to pay.
According to the effective demand for each arrangement,
plots may either be rented, leased, purchased, or rented-with-
option-to-buy by the families. Their dwelling structures may
be constructed by wholly self-help methods, or by a combination
of self-help and government construction. The scheme can either
allow or disallow mixed uses (residential as well as income
earning uses) for the individual dwellings or plots. The cost
burden and debt servicing may be on a market basis, or may
entail direct or indirect government subsidies. Even the mix
and range of the public utilities and community facilities to
be provided should be in response to the effective demand for
these services by the resident families.
It is conceivable under this principle to plan settlement
areas which can accomodate poor urban households of different
levels of income (from the very poor to the not-so-poor) and
provide them with differential housing services. The provision
of water, for example, can be categorized into individual
servicing of plots or collective servicing of a small cluster
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of plots. Similarly, differential use of water can be related
to distribution: potable piped water distributed less intensively
than less-pure well water to be used for washing purposes.
Since the primary consideration, however, is the redistributional
effect of housing action, the scheme should be deliberately
oriented toward serving the needs of those in direct need before
those in less need.
One country example which bears study for its potential
applicability to the Philippine situation is the staged sites-
and-services program undertaken by the Chile government in
1
recent years. Chilean housing and urban development policymakers
shifted their policy from one preoccupied with large-scale
construction of dwelling units to a policy based on the progres-
sive improvement of housing conditions among urban low-income
households. In contrast to the traditional policy of providing
all services at once, the government instituted a Popular
Savings Plan which allowed a staged process of improvement in
housing services.
Low-income families were urged to enroll in the savings-
for-housing scheme, in which they could opt for any one of
four differential housing services schemes. Depending on the
plan which they chose, they were required to accumulate pres-
cribed amounts of savings over a period from one year to two
years. The family was assigned to a site once the required
initial savings was reached. Further savings would then allow
the family, now settled in the new site, to qualify for the
the houses of more progressive plans. The progress from sites-
only to fully-built houses on the sites was facilitated by home
improvement loans which enabled families to expand any earlier
plan within the system to any higher plan. The houses could
either be built directly by the responsible government agency,
or by self-help plans organized by the cooperatives of the new
settlement. The 4-plan scheme utilized to mobilize savings
from the low-income sector and to employ the accumulated resources
for home improvement is outlined below.
Plan 1 Operation Site -- First Stage
(a) Land -- average 170 sq.m.
(b) Water -- one outlet per site
(c) Electricity -- one outlet per site
(d) Wood panels for walls and roof of temporary house
Plan 2 Urbanized Site
(a) Completion of urbanization -- sewerage and
pavement grids
Plan 3 (a) Completely urbanized site
(b) Basic house (20 sq.m.) of permanent materials, or
(c) Basic house (36 sq.m.) without interior walls and
finishing
Plan 4 (a) Completely urbanized site
(b) 2-bedroom apartment (usually in a 4-story
building) of approximately 45 sq.m.
More recently the savings plan incorporated into it a
point system which allowed for even more refined screening
procedures. Aside from just the savings requirements, consi-
derations such as family size, present dwelling status, total
family income, and minimum savings were taken altogether to
determine the level of housing services that was to be provided
for a low-income household.
C. Sites and Services in Already-existing Squatter Settlements
in the Central City
It has been emphasized that relocation is a viable
alternative for some low-income urban households and not for
others. Depending on whether or not relocation is able to
accomodate the families' life priorities and their income-
earning activities. There are squatter families who necessarily
equate their residence in the central city with nearness to
income-earning opportunities and who therefore regard relocation
as a cruel uprooting form the only place where they can success-
fully eke even a hand-to-mouth existence. For these families
there is no alternative better than staying in the central city.
The high abandonment rate in existing resettlement sites is
a strong testimony of this perception among a cerr9in group
of low-income urban households.
Since central-city residence is vital to these families,
any serious government effort to provide them with more and
better housing services must be undertaken within the perimeters
of the central city. Here, as in new settlements, sites-and-
services schemes offer flexible "housing solutions." The
program can similarly stress progressive upgrading, starting
with initial improvement at the environmental level and then
moving through phases of providing full urban services, shelter
and home improvement.
Here again, the range of legal and financial relation-
ships between government and households allows for variation.
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Land may be sold to the families, or they may be granted title
to land which they have long occupied. In most cases the most
preferable option may be to extend middle- to long-term leases
on land which is not earmarked for immediate development and
construction. The important consideration in any arrangement
is that these lowest-income families come to enjoy greater
security in the matter of land tenure and are provided with
certain basic necessities -- water and sanitation. If eviction
is eventually necessary, the move can be anticipated and planned
for well in advance, and would be justified by area redevelopment
purposes rather than by speculative slum-eradication goals.
An excellent case which points up not only the desira-
bility but more importantly, the feasibility of the sites-and-
services scheme in central-city locations is the proposal
submitted to the Philippine President by the residents of
Tondo Zone One (one of the most densely-populated squatter
2
communities in Manila) in early 1973. The Zone One Tondo
Organization drew up an alternative proposal to the government's
active slum and squatter eradication preliminary to its plans
for port development in the Tondo area. The President's
favorable response to the ZOTO alternative effected the discon-
tinuation of demolition work until such time that the families
who were to be evicted could be resettled in an area just
north of Tondo which was to be developed and readied for the
transfer of Tondo families.
A 300-hectare area of the Navotas shoreline has been
earmarked as the resettlement site for approximately 16,000
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Tondo households. The ZOTO proposal called for the allocation
of a minimum of 50 sq.m. of land for each family, to be paid
over 10 years at P100 a year. As outlined in the proposal,
the activities for sites-and-services development was divided
among the government agencies, the German foundation who was
participating in the rehousing plan, and the Zone One Tondo
Organization members themselves.
Procedure:
The special committee to be composed of representatives
from the government, ZOTO and the Protestant Central Agency
for Development Aid shall be over-all in charge of planning
and administration. Otherwise, each of these entities shall
perform its role delineated thus:
a. The government reclaims the land from the sea,
surveys and subdivides it, making adequate provision for
public facilities. It shoulders the cost of reclamation
(P20 M for 100 hectares at the rate of P20 per square meter)
and construction of public utilities. It should award the
title to each lot upon the owner's completion of payment.
b. The German foundation shall shoulder the cost of
the housing project (V 2,500 per dwelling unit for materials
only) by making available the one million dollar grant to ZOTO.
It is highly preferred that the German foundation represen-
tative to the committee be a technical man so that he can
assist in the planning and administration of the project.
c. ZOTO shall provide the manpower supply in building
the dwelling units and-in making the needed improvements of
public facilities.
D. AIDED SELF-HELP HOUSING IMPROVEMENT
An important aspect which the ZOTO example also introduces
to the area of Philippine housing policy is the concept of aided
self-help in housing improvement. Past policies have altogether
discounted the resources that low-income urban households can
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bring in to significantly improve their housing situation. The
alternative proposed here calls for a reappraisal of the parti-
cipatory role of low-income families who are the intended bene-
ficiaries of any government housing action. It is the families
themselves, rather than the planners and housing officials, who
can best identify their priorities that must be respected and main-
tained by any housing strategy. It is they who can most accurately
evaluate the viability of proposed housing "solutions" and the
relevance of such programs to their environmental problems. As
they have proven in their lifestyle in the urban areas, and as
communities like Zone One Tondo have strongly demonstrated, low-
income urban families in slum and squatter settlements can be
counted on to avail of the opporbiinities to them, no matter how
limited, in order to earn as much as they can and live as comfor-
tably as possible.
Their resourcefulness in discovering the most appropriate
"housing solution" is only inhibited by the lack of opportunities
open to them. There is an essential requisite therefore for commu-
nity based strategies such as this: namely, conscious encouragement
of programs which incorporate aided self-help and which lend them-
selves to maximum mobilization of the resources of low-income house-
holds, in terms of their participation in planning, decisionmaking,
financing, infrastructure development, and so forth, in the scheme.
The ZOTO community has shown that massive participation of
low-income residents can effect housing solutions which are unlikely
to be surpassed in effectivity (least-cost, highest benefits equi-
72
tably distributed) by solutions offered by other outside parties.
The string of benefits enjoyed by households who organize them-
selves and initiate community improvement can be gleaned from
even an incomplete listing of ZOTO's achievements in this respect.
Among the things that ZOTO has taken upon itself to do
are the physical organization of the district into eight communities,
and the establishment of such community services like emergency
relief, job placement, and health services for its residents. The
devastation caused by a typhoon in late 1970 prompted ZOTO to seek
aid from outside sources: it obtained $10,000 in aid from a reli-
gious group for purchase of 5,000 iron roofing sheets for families
whose homes were rendered roofless, and also won demands for regu-
lar relief provisions from another Church group. It staged recur-
rent pickets and land invasions to protest government construction
on sites which ZOTO felt should remain vacant for eventual relo-
cation, until they were given government assurance that further
construction would accomodate the needs of Tondo families. ZOTO
and other groups supporting it also succeeded in working for the
defeat of a Congressional bill creating a Tondo Development Autho-
rity which would eventually dispossess the residents of their legal
claim to the land. More recently, the organization has gained
favorable response to the alternative housing scheme it submitted
to the Philippine President, and the community is more hopeful
about better housing and an improved environment through a joing
development scheme between ZOTO (aided by a German foundation)
and the Philippine government.
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Considering that ZOTO's self-help efforts have been largely
unaided by public policy and projects, and more frequently ignored
or violently opposed by the authorities, self-help efforts which
are instead actually openly supported by relevant agencies hold
out even greater possibilities for substantial housing improvement.
In sum, the forms which aid can take, and the ways that families
can directly participate in housing improvement programs encompass
broad areas of joint participation. These include
(1) phases of policymaking -- families collectively work with
authorities during analysis of housing "problems" and
develop broad program, schedule activities, allocate
resources, work for necessary legislation or executive
orders.
(2) technical operation -- authorities can bring technical
advice, or community can seek their own, on matters of
design, use of materials, construction, etc.
(3) labor -- families shoulder most of the labor burden, with
some assistance from authorities in more difficult con-
struction phases, such as laying of infrastructure
(4) land -- government provides land or extends secure land
tenure, or families may already have land upon which to
build.
(5) financial resources -- families mobilize their savings,
with counterpart funding from government either through
direct or indirect subsidies, or support from outside
sources
(6) building materials -- families supply what they have or
what is easily available locally; government may provide
assured supplies of needed materials
(7) administration and organization -- residents and adminis-
trative personnel from government work together in imple-
mentation of ongoing housing improvement schemes.
Summary
The flexibility which sites-and-services development and
aided self-help provide is an essential policy advantage; there is
a broad spectrum of public intervention to meet the housing needs
of lower-income households. For those families who are stably-
employed and who prefer to move out of their central-city accomo-
dations, for example, the programs can provide serviced sites
in the urban periphery, with minimal government subsidy for actual
housing construction. For the poorest families and those who do
not yet enjoy stable incomes, the programs allow them to stay
near their income-earning opportunities by extending inner-city
plots (rental, lease, or purchase terms) and the substantial im-
provement of urban services, such as potable water supply, adequate
sanitation, storm drainage, etc. The flexibility of sites-and-
services and self-help housing improvement in turn effects a better
match between the families' priorities for residential location,
and the combinations of site and various services offered in the
schemes.
Because of the relatively lower capital investments required
by these programs, as opposed to the real costs per family encoun-
tered in past housing action, the alternatives can effect a more
equitable distribution of housing benefits. Families who were
previously priced out of the housing market are enabled to parti-
cipate in a broadened market. Most importantly, a baseline of
residential services for the entire urban population, not only
for the urban affluent families, is established with little capital
and government-owned land consumed.
The security of tenure offered by the alternatives posed
here is an important motivation for families to invest in home
improvement through incremental improvement and progressive con-
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struction. This avoids high-cost ambitious projects which may be
intended for the poor but which inadvertently end up housing the
non-poor. The smaller investment per unit and per family made
possible by the programs offers more assurance that the government
will be able to deliver housing services to those it intends to
serve, and still be able to control expenditures.
E. CONTROLS ON RENTAL HOUSING
Because a substantial proportion of low-income families
are compelled to take rental accomodations, for want of rentless
housing, a strategy to house the urban poor must include measures
to ensure that families get the housing services they pay for.
A significant start in public policy in this direction has been
made in the rent freeze declared on rental housing costing P300
or less per month. However, considering that some low-income
families pay rent to slum or squatter landlords who operate quite
outside the formal housing market, public policy must utilize
special controls in this area. If, as proposed in sites-and-ser-
vices and aided self-help schemes, community participation and
collective decisionmaking is the rule in rental housing -- for
example, as in organized tenants' organizations -- then control
on rents is more likely to be effective. The progressive improve-
ment of housing services due to rental payments is moreover
better assured, and a deliberate policy to upgrade existing hous-
ing stock would do well to focus attention on urban rental housing.
Forms of government subsidy to lowest-income families in rental
housing deserve study as part of the broader home improvement policy.
76
F. FINANCING A STRATEGY TO HOUSE THE URBAN POOR
What follows is a listing of the sources of funds that
can be immediately established or tapped for purposes of providing
housing services to lowest-income households in the cities. No
more than a general listing is attempted here, for a detailed
discussion of the financing framework is quite beyond the scope
of this paper.
1. Forms of popular-savings plans which encourage and mobilize
savings from low-income families themselves.
The Chilean example illustrates how progressive savings
capacities of families can be matched with progressive housing
improvement in terms of land occupancy and level of urban services.
Such mobilization of private savings calls for a highly-participa-
tory organization on the part of families involved, to ensure not
only rapid mobilization of funds but also efficient and honest use
of their hard-earned savings. Cooperatives and similarly community-
based credit unions and savings associations seem to lend them-
selves to these popularly-initiated programs.
2. Investment by government financing institutions: GSIS, SSS, DBP
Since the Government Service Insurance System, the Social
Security System and the Development Bank of the Philippines remain
the major sources of housing finance, it is very possi#le that
they be tapped for low-income housing services. The GSIS and the
SSS in particular, should institute loan plans directed toward
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their lower-income members who constitute the majority membership
but who do not now enjoy the loan benefits extended by the SSS and
GSIS. A. reorientation of their lending policies, from one heavily
biased to benefitting their highest-income members to one which
distributes benefits more widely and equitably among its members
is likely to remedy the glaring inequities in lending policies.
This will also mean that the GSIS and SSS must accomodate smaller
housing loans for purposes other than financing new house-and-lot
purchases of their members. The forced savings accruing to lower-
income members must be allowed to be channelled to incremental
housing improvement as the most viable housing alternative open
to this income group. This way, SSS and GSIS allocate fewer
amounts of its investible funds to each member-household, thereby
spreading risks as it spreads resources over many more families.
The Development Bank of the Philippines, on the other hand,
since it is already into low-cost home financing would be able
to expand its lending capabilities by allowing for non-standard-
ized dwellings which do not necessarily conform to its rigid
design specifications, and by extending more assistance to low-
income families in home improvement schemes.
3. Increased government appropriations
"Social housing" as it is categorized by government is wholly
dependent on government revenue and appropriations from the budget.
The problem is that of the total government-built or government-
assisted housing covered by the already limited government funds,
78
only 20% is built for low-income families, and only 3 % of total
government housing investment actually goes to "social housing."
If government seriously aims to provide for the needs of the 65%
of the urban population who could not afford adequate housing if
unassisted, then government should remedy the blatantly dispro-
portionate appropriations for low-income housing. Certainly budget
appropriations for housing the lowest-income families will have
to be increased, if the strategy is to be an improvement over
simple slum clearance methods. Lowest-income families are not
stable income-earners and are therefore disqualified from SSS or
GSIS membership; as such the only source of housing assistance
available to them from government is direct government appropria-
tions, which must not only be substantially increased but also
be significantly directed to the needs of the poorest families.
4. Tax measures
Corollary to increased budget appropriations are increases
in tax revenue generated for housing purposes. Raising revenue
from additional taxes (particularly those of a more progressive
nature than most taxes in the country) have been proposed in the
Housing Act of 1970 and have been outlined in the national four-
year plans. The new tax sources would include employers payroll
tax; tax on high-cost dwellings; additional residential tax;
additional real estate tax; and a special housing development tax.
If stringently executed, these measures may enable government not
only to distribute its funds more equitably, but also to increase
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its outlay for land acquisition and infrastructure development
as well.
Some policy guidelines also entail tax incentives which
effect more rational land-use and settlement patterns; incentives
for industrial dispersal will induce deconcentration of inner-city
population as well as attract migrants to growth centers other
than larger, densely-populated urban centers. Taxes on idle land
also encourages development and discourages land hoarding for
speculative ends.
5. Land acquisition by government
Since land is a major component of housing development,
and since land cost is a substantial cost factor in urban areas,
steps to enable government to acquire and retain urban land are
necessary. The alternative presented in this paper entails a
comprehensive planning approach which anticipates extensive faci-
lities and urban services, and which therefore requires ade-
quate supply of available publicly-controlled land. Expropria-
tion and excess concb3lnation, prerogatives not taken by govern-
ment until very recently, can be effective means of assembling
much-needed urban sites. These measures also require a comple-
mentary policy of stopping the sale of prime urban sites already
controlled by government to private interests, particularly if
the public properties are useful and necessary for planned
urban growth and human settlement.
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6. Other sources: foreign financing, private capital participation
Funding agencies like the World Bank, United Nations Deve-
lopment Program, and the US-Agency for International Development
have indicated growing interest in participating in low-income
housing programs such as sites-and-services and aided self-help,
and using these agencies as funding sources may be explored. More-
over, other foreign foundations such as those which have extended
housing assistance to community organizations like ZOTO can also
be tapped, perhaps too with less danger that aid will be tied
to the donor country or agency.
On the other hand, private developers and housing finan-
ciers in the Philippines can also be a source of housing funds,
given the proper incentives. These institutions generally urge
the creation of a secondary mortgage market which will provide
them the necessary incentives and guarantees to invest more in
housing and development projects. This channel of financing may
well be developed for the pursuit of economic housing programs --
building for those who can pay the high cost of privately-developed
housing. If private capital participation is encouraged enough,
then the scarce government funds which now are spent on economic
housing can be concentrated instead on low-income housing, as
the private sector increasingly takes on the financing of high-
cost, high-income housing.
Sources of housing funds are in the long run determined
by the broad economic policies and political measures introduced
by the Philippine government. The next section discusses the
broader context of economic and political issues that a com-
prehensive strategy for housing the urban poor must contend with.
F. RE-DIRECTING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS
In order to be effective, an alternative housing strategy
must be integrated with economic policies and political decisions
which grapple with Philippines' major development problems.
Firstly, economic policy must be directed toward generating
increasing employment opportunities for the expanding labor force.
Industrial development must become more labor-absorptive, requiring
more labor resources than capital resources, and depending more
on domestic inputs rather than on foreign inputs.
Only deliberate policies at employment creation will effect
the restructuring of the labor market so as to minimize underem-
ployment in both the countryside and cities. More productive labor
utilization in the rural areas will reduce migration to the cities,
and greater employment opportunities in the cities will begin to
close the gap between the very rich and the very poor. More sta-
ble incomes for the greater proportion of the urban population
will manifest itself in a slowing-down of slum and squatter settle-
ment formation, and gradual improvement of the urban environment.
But industrial promotion will have to carry built-in biases
toward more labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive tech-
niques of production, through such priorities and incentives now
set by the Board of Investment for preferred industries. Moreover
since capital resources will be relatively less important, it becomes
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more feasible to rely almost only on domestic capital resources --
and thereby loosen the tight hold of foreign participation on
the economy. Specific areas where presently capital-intensive
activities can be made more labor-absorptive are public and pri-
vate construction and infrastructure projects, and the choice of
techniques of new plant equipment in new industrial firms.
Secondly, public policy should seek to maintain a balance
between the development of the industrial sector and of the agri-
cultural sector, and among the different regions of the country.
Most inputs into industries must depend on the primary activities
of agriculture and mining. Since further industrial growth is
assured only by increased agricultural productivity and increased
agricultural incomes (particularly since 65% of the country's
population is still engaged in the agricltural sector), the
backward integration of industries with agricultural production is
essential for developing both sectors. While past policy has
limited agricultural production to more profitable export of
primary products: sugar, coconut, minerals, logs -- new policy
must take steps to increase food production for domestic consump-
tion also, as well as to process mineral and forest products --
steps which ultimately expand industrial activity.
The imbalance in the growth of regions -- particularly
between the industrial growth of the metropolitan Manila area
and the other regions which have lagged far behind -- call for
more explicit regional development strategies. Regional plans
must strengthen the flow of goods and services between the rural
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and urban sectors and between agricultural and industrial sectors.
What is important is that the industrial sector be linked in
both supply and demand aspects to the rest of the local economy,
rather than, as in the past, to materials and markets abroad.
The agricultural sector, on the other hand, must provide the
bulk of the consumption needs of workers dependent on industry.
Along with regional development strategies must be esta-
blished deliberate steps to slow down population movement to the
already-congested urban centers. Options include the development
of smaller-sixed urban centers to act as countermagnet cities
and new growth points in the region. Such a strategy requires
guidelines for the location of industries and infrastructure,
as well as for the planned settlement of the population moving
into the new growth centers.
Thirdly, policies to accelerate economic growth must include
increasing the export capabilities of the Philippines (not so
much in terms of a few primary products, but in terms of divers-
fied manufactured goods competitive in the world market). Indus-
trial expansion must also be based on new internal demand, and on
industries which link with earlier import-substituting industries.
Underlying all economic policy must be equal consideration
for equity criteria -- participation in the national economic pie
-- as for efficiency criteria. A re-examination of the share of
domestic versus foreign participation in the economy, of the
regressive versus progressive nature of the tax system, of more
consumer-oriented policies which control inflationary prices and
profits -- all these can produce significant results, given the
organized participation of the population in the fundamental deci-
sionmaking processes of the country.
A strong, highly-centralized government such as that pre-
vailing in the Philippines today is more likely than ever before
to have the resources on hand to effect the economic policies
cited above as necessary contexts for an effective strategy to
house the urban poor. The socio-political organization envisioned
in the "New Society's" declaration of principles is also potentially
a useful and important network for highly-participatory political
decisionmaking on the part of the greater masses of Filipinos. It
would seem that the deciding factor for the implementation of
truly development-oriented policies in the Philippines today is a
strong political commitment by the present administration, backed
'4sby popular participation and support.
Only then can housing the urban poor become a realistic
development objective for the Philippines.
NOTES Chapter Five
1. W. Grindley and R. Merrill, SITES AND SERVICES, THE EXPE_
RIENCE AND POTENTIAL, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, International
Development Association, 1972, Part II Sites
and Services in Chile.
2. Zone One Tondo Organization Report, mimeographed copy,
January 1974
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